Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Cognitive Transparency: If it is in my mind, then it will be evident to me that it is.
Cognitive incorrigibility: I can’t be mistaken about what I take to be the contents of my own thoughts. If on introspection, I take X to be a content of my own mind, then it is true that X is one of my mental contents.
Belief access: If I believe it, then I am or I can become aware that I do, and the same for my disbeliefs.
Justification Access—I have privileged access to the reasons, evidence, or considerations that led to my believing what I do. My reasons for believing p will be incorrigible and transparent to me.
Propositional/Belief Modularity--beliefs are modular. You either have one or you do not. You change your mind and cease to have it, and so on. Beliefs, and the cognitive structures in mind that contain or map them, have syntactic or logical structure and relationships, and they have semantic content.
Intuitionism: my immediately introspected hunches/feelings/reactions to philosophical thought experiments or questions about natural, metaphysical, or logical possibility can be treated either as highly reliable or perfectly reliable (!) indicators of natural, metaphysical, or logical possibility in the right sorts of circumstances. My intuitions are data that should be incorporated into philosophical theories or arguments.
The influence of these approaches and presumptions is beginning to wane in the discipline, but many of them, or versions of them play central roles in theistic arguments and positions. Some people allege to have immediate, direct awareness of God's presence in the universe. The Holy Spirit "witnesses" to others, providing allegedly incontrovertible knowledge of the divine. Some claim awareness of a special set of non-physical, objective moral facts in their minds that prove the existence of a transcendent moral agent.
Here are some fascinating research and articles that could pull the rug out from under introspectionism and intuitionism:
Nisbett, Richard and Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes
Posted by Matt McCormick at 12:56 PM