Building Self-Aware Machines

The public mood toward the prospect of artificial intelligence is dark.  Increasingly, people fear the results of creating an intelligence whose abilities will far exceed our own, and who pursues goals that are not compatible with our own.  See Nick Bostrom’s Superintelligence:  Paths, Dangers, Strategies for a good summary of those arguments.  I think resistance is a mistake (and futile) and I think we should be actively striving toward the construction of artificial intelligence.

When we ask “Can a machine be conscious?,” I believe we often misses several important distinctions.  With regard to the AI project, we would be better off distinguishing at least between qualitative/phenomenal states, exterior self-modeling, interior self-modeling, information processing, attention, sentience, executive top-down control, self-awareness, and so on.  Once we make a number of these distinctions, it becomes clear that we have already created systems with some of these capacities, others are not far off, and still others present the biggest challenges to the project. Here I will focus just on two, following Drew McDermott:  interior and exterior self-modeling. 

A cognitive system has a self-model if it has the capacity to represent, acknowledge, or take account of itself as an object in the world with other objects.  Exterior self-modeling requires treating the self solely as a physical, spatial-temporal object among other objects.  So you can easily spatially locate yourself in the room, you have a representation of where you are in relation to your mother’s house, or perhaps to the Eiffel Tower.  You can also easily temporally locate yourself.  You represent Napoleon as am 18^th century French Emperor, and you are aware that the segment of time that you occupy is after the segment of time that he occupied.  Children swinging from one bar to another on the playground are employing an exterior self-model, as is a ground squirrel running back to its burrow.  

Exterior self-modeling is relatively easy to build into an artificial system compared to many other tasks that face the AI project.  Your phone is technologically advanced enough to put itself in a location in space in relationship to other objects with its GPS system.  I built a CNC machine in my garage (Computer Numeric Controlled cutting system) that I ”zero” out when I start it up.  I designate a location in a three dimensional coordinate system as (0, 0, 0) for the X, Y, and Z axes, then the machine keeps track of where it is in relation to that point as it cuts.  When it’s finished, it returns to (0, 0, 0).  The system knows where it is in space, at least in the very small segment of space that it is capable of representing (About 36” x 24” x 5”). 

Interior self-modeling is the capacity to represent yourself as an information processing, epistemic, representational agent.  That is, a system has an interior self-model if it represents the state of its own informational, cognitive capacities.  Loosely, it is knowing what you know and knowing what you don’t know.  It is a system that is able to locate the state of its own information about the world within a range of possible states.  When you recognize that watching too much Fox News might be contributing to your being negative about President Obama, you are employing an interior self-model.  When you resolve to not make a decision about which car to buy until you’ve done some more research, or when you wait until after the debates to decide which candidate to vote for, you are exercising your interior self-model.  You have located yourself as a thinking, believing, judging agent within a range of possible information states.  Making decisions requires information.  Making good decisions requires being able to assess how much information you have, how good it is, and how much more (or less) you need or how much better you need it to be in order to decide within the tolerances of your margins of error. 

So in order to endow an artificial cognitive system with an interior self-model, we must build it to model itself as an information system similar to how we’d build it to model itself in space and time.  Hypothetically, a system can have no information, or it can have all of the information.  And the information it has can be poor quality, with a high likelihood of being false, or it can be high quality, with a high likelihood of being true.  Those two dimensions are like a spatial-temporal framework, and the system must be able to locate its own information state within that range of possibilities.  Then the system, if we want it to make good decisions, must be able to recognize the difference between the state it is in and the minimally acceptable information state it should be in.  Then, ideally, we’d build it with the tools to close that gap.  Imagine a doctor who is presented with a patient with an unfamiliar set of symptoms.  Recognizing that she doesn’t have enough information to diagnosis the problem, she does a literature search so that she can responsibly address it.  Now imagine an artificial system with reliable decisions heuristics that recognizes the adequacy or inadequacy of its information base, and then does a medical literature review that is far more comprehensive, consistent, and discerning than a human doctor is capable of.  At the first level, our AI system needs to be able to compile and process information that will produce a decision.  But at the second level, our AI system must be able to judge its own fitness for making that decision and rectify the information state short coming if there is one.  Representing itself as an epistemic agent in this fashion strikes me as one of the most important and interesting ways to flesh out the notion of being “self-aware” that is often brought up when we ask the question “Can a machine be conscious?” 

McDermott, Drew.  “Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness,”  The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, 117-150.  Zelazo, Moscovitch, and Thompson, eds.  2007.  Also here:  http://www.cs.yale.edu/homes/dvm/papers/conscioushb.pdf

The Myth of the Afterlife

This just came out.  I wrote the lead chapter in it.  Buy it at Amazon:

The Myth of the Afterlife

The F Word Lecture

Here's video, shot by Nathan Lusher (Thanks Nathan!), of my talk from Manteca a few days ago.  I spoke to the Stanislaus Humanists at the Manteca Public Library.  This year there wasn't a huge angry mob outside, but hey, you can't win them all.  

Many believers defend their belief by invoking faith.  Believing by faith, we are told, solves whatever problems there may be with the evidence.  Believing by faith is widely thought to be admirable and virtuous.  

But believing despite lacking or contrary evidence is dangerously misguided.  I make a case to believers why they should not resort to this defense and I explain why faith from the believer to the skeptic cannot be prescriptive.  It implies no intellectual obligation to believe.  Faith is believing without rules.  

The F Word

The F Word.

I'm speaking to a secular humanists group tonight in Manteca at the Manteca Public Library at 7:00.  I'll be talking about the problems with believing by faith.

My presentation is here.

Three Lectures on Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology

Ad hominem: Your Sins Keep You from Seeing God

I'm recycling this post from 2007.  This guy put his finger on something:

A group of philosophers sympathetic with the Christian take on things have constructed a complicated and technical account of God beliefs and their source in human cognition known as reformed epistemology. On the view, espoused by Plantinga and Wolterstorff and widely cited and supported in recent years, humans are endowed by God with an innate faculty for sensing God under the right circumstances. This sensus divinitatus is one aspect of a properly functioning cognitive and belief forming system in humans. When it is not corrupted by the invasive noetic effects of sin, this faculty produces a belief in God that is immediate, direct, and non-inferentially justified. That is, a belief in God is properly basic according to the reformed epistemologists. It is not supported by any other independent or more fundamental facts. It cannot be justified on the basis of other beliefs. Rather, it’s axiomatic like the law of non-contradiction or the identity of indiscernibles. The sensus divinitatus will manifest itself in a variety of ways—when you see a sweeping vista of majestic mountaintops, or when your first child is born, or upon pondering the vastness and magnificence of the universe in the night sky.

Misinterpreting these feelings of the divine as indicators of a non-Christian God as a Hindu might, or suppressing them and denying that God is manifest in experience are all the by-products of a sinful nature. Doubters, skeptics, and deniers—anyone who doesn’t buy into the Reformed Epistemology picture—have all had their God given God detectors corrupted, co-opted, and distorted by sin. What they need, of course, is the salvation of Jesus to cleanse them of their immorality and to restore the proper function of their belief faculties. Then they will see that they were not right with God before. And then they will have properly basis religious experience of God. So the view has a the tidy way to deal with criticisms and legitimate objections. No objection to the whole scheme can have any merit because it arises from doubt, which is really just wickedness. If you had some experiences that seemed to have profound religious significance, like any normal person you would wonder about alternative explanations. Could this just be a weird artifact of my neurology? I wonder what natural explanation there could be for this strange disassociation? Maybe I ate something bad? The full-blown theistic supernatural explanation is one possibility. But according to Reformed Epistemology any suspicion that you have that it might have been something natural is really the result of your innately evil nature and the taint that sin has placed on your ability to think straight. They position undercuts any objections with an ad hominem attack on the moral character of the questioner. 

The whole scheme is also clever (and insidious) for inventing a notion of private evidence that shouldn’t be held up for any public scrutiny by someone who has doubts. Once you’re in the special club, you’re provided with “self-authenticating witness of the holy spirit” that gives you perfect, unassailable assurance about your God doctrine no matter what empirical questions or doubts may arise. Ordinarily, evidence is something that is sharable and public. The prosecuting attorney displays the gun that was the murder weapon for everyone in the court, the dentist looks at X-rays, and your mechanic points to the leaking oil around a gasket as evidence that there is a problem. But this special God feeling isn’t like that; it’s just a feeling you have that something’s got to be true, so it can’t be shared with anyone else. Plantinga and some of the people in this camp suggest that the earnest Christian in this situation ought to consider alternative explanations for their experience. Many properly basic beliefs, including the God one presumably, are defeasible. If you have the experiences, and if your conviction that that’s really God your feeling persists after you have scrutinized the belief and reflected on what might be causing it, then you will have a warranted, and true belief that there is a God.

Needless to say, the notion of private evidence here is deeply problematic. Imagine an IRS agent telling you that she’s got self-authenticating, private evidence that you can’t see that you owe the government an extra $20,000 tax dollars. Imagine a doctor telling you that she’s got self-authenticating evidence that you’ve got cancer, but the evidence can’t be grasped by anyone who doesn’t already believe it. Or imagine your husband telling you that he’s got special, private, self-authenticating evidence that you’ve been cheating on him. Then suppose furthermore that they assure you that their conclusion is right because they have thought long and hard about it and considered other possibilities. Evidence that's private isn't really evidence at all and a mere feeling that something just must be true, no matter how strong or persistent, is never enough to give it warrant. 

Here’s a model of human rationality and religious belief that is much more accurate. Humans are endowed by evolution with a remarkably effective set of problem solving skills that can be group loosely under the general heading “reason.” In the right circumstances, our reason allows us to devise complicated and elegant solutions to challenges, make accurate inferences and predictions, and arrive at many well-justified and true beliefs. We manage to cure diseases like polio and land people on the moon. But our cognitive systems are kludgey and imperfect. They’re strapped together with disparate functions and tools that were available at various stages in a long, convoluted evolutionary history. Sometimes they don’t track the truth at all, like when you have an attack of claustrophobia, or you can’t bear to even look at a dish that once made you sick when you were a child. Sometimes our cognitive faculties overreact, mislead, underestimate, or misjudge. 

Our fancier faculties of reason are also often overwhelmed by a variety of emotional, psychological, and biological forces that erode our ability to reason well and see the truth. One legacy of our evolutionary history appears to be a powerful disposition towards religious belief, experiences, and feelings. Daniel Dennett and Stephen Pinker have recently argued that natural selection may have endowed us with a sort of mind-attribution module. Construing other organisms behavior as the product of the planning and goals within their minds, whether they really have them or not, would be an effective mechanism for anticipating and projecting the behaviors of potential predators and prey. But we’re just built to take it too far and endow everything with a mind—the wind, the ocean, the starry sky, and the world itself. 

In an earlier post, I called it the Urge—a powerful and seductive need we have to be religious. Completely aside from the factual question of God, it is obvious to anyone who observes humans and their religious activities that we desperately want there to be a God and we will adopt the most contorted gymnastics of reasoning to rationalize the belief. Even if there are some theists with good reasons, there are far more with sloppy, fallacy ridden, biased grounds that they offer for their beliefs. And in lots of these cases, it’s not really the poor reasoning that is offered in defense of someone’s God belief that led them to believe at all. More often it is the case that people have the belief first as a result of the Urge’s infiltration of their consciousness, and then they back fill that conclusion with some superficial reasons. So the Urge is really the dark side of your nature that threatens to corrupt your more noble aspects. It’s the alluring, siren call of religion itself, not sin, that will co-opt reason’s ability to see the world in an accurate light. 

Staying on the straight and narrow will require resisting the temptation of religion’s easy, emotionally satisfying answers to the biggest metaphysical questions. Living up to your potential to reason clearly and evaluate the evidence objectively demands that you be constantly vigilant against seduction of religion’s false comforts.

Double Standards for Jesus

I got interviewed by Alan Litchfield recently for his podcast:

http://www.malcontentsgambit.com/2014/03/11/philosopher-argues-against-christianitys-double-standard/

Take a listen to hear me get pretty heated up about the narcissism of many contemporary Christians' views about God, and for details about my recent Manteca lecture that was met with a crowd of angry, tongues-speaking evangelicals trying to exorcise me out of town.

New Lecture on Motivated Reasoning

Thinking Critically About God

My recent lecture to the Stanislaus Humanists in Manteca, CA on Jan. 15 has caused some controversy locally.  See some of the heated letters to the editor here:

www.mantecabulletin.com under the Opinion section.  

In response, I wrote this letter to the editor of the paper.  Let's hope they publish it and I get an opportunity to talk to some of that local church groups.  The pastor of the church that demonstrated that night has declined my offer.  

My name is Matt McCormick.  I am the professor who gave the lecture to the Stanislaus Humanist group at the Manteca Library on January 15. 

I’d like to thank the Stanislaus Humanists for inviting me to speak.  And I’d like to thank all of the people from Manteca who came out either to hear me speak, or to participate in the events outside the building that night. 

My lecture has stirred up quite a bit of controversy.  I’d like to present a few thoughts on what I take to be a fundamental issue, and I’d like to make an offer to any churches or other groups in Manteca. 

The most fundamental requirement for a successful democracy, and for human prosperity and happiness, is for individuals to, first, be informed with the full range of relevant ideas, particularly concerning important decisions, and, second, for them to have the critical thinking skills to be able to reason clearly, accurately, and reliably about that body of information. 

In religious organizations, to a greater or lesser extent depending on the tradition, the social model is fundamentally authoritarian; the clergy lead, they shepherd, they give their congregations the answers, they enforce belief conformity, they exclude dissenters, they exclude contrary ideas, they discourage doubts, and they discourage independent thinking.  Much of this was evident in the dangerous rhetoric in response to my coming to speak in Manteca.  Many of the comments and reactions before, during and after have been dangerous, combative, and confrontational.  One pastor, praying about my lecture before I came to town said, “We drive back any atheist movement right now in the name of Jesus. . . We must repel the demonic attack on our city," and he prayed, "God, cause a storm to happen or something [on Wednesday night]."  Another pastor said that I was an "evangelical atheist," and "they're going to try to put up billboards, they're going to try to do other things to convince people that God is not real. . .  And, as far as I'm concerned, this is our house.  This is our house.  This is our city." 

The social model for a liberal arts education at a university like where I am a professor is fundamentally democratic; my job is to encourage people to actively consider contrary ideas, think for themselves, make their own decisions, be independent, to not blindly trust authority, and to not be manipulated by emotional ploys or rhetoric.  Our goal is to get people to reason well.  We are neutral with regard to the outcome of that reasoning process; people should be free to draw whatever conclusion they deem to be best supported by sound reasoning and the evidence.  Creating atheists is not my goal; I would rather people become thoughtful, rational, well-informed believers in God than have them be dogmatic and irrational. 

Many pastors, preachers, priests, and other clergy are dedicated to keeping you believing no matter what the evidence is.  And they wittingly or unwittingly use a variety of methods to do it that are at odds with your being an independent, informed, and effective critical thinker.  Some of them and some of their methods encourage ignorance, superstition, intolerance, irrationality, and narrow-mindedness.  We should all be deeply concerned about clergy who would capitalize on the ignorance of people who don't have the critical thinking skills or the information to know any better, to keep them from making thoughtful, informed, reasonable decisions for themselves. 

So with all of that in mind, I’d like to make an offer.  I would like to come and speak to any church or group in the Manteca area who would host me, and present some of my questions and doubts about the resurrection of Jesus.  People should have free access to information, including viewpoints that may seem outrageous or offensive, and they should be able to develop informed, reasonable conclusions about matters of great importance on the basis of the full body of relevant information.  My email address is mccormick@csus.edu

Talking them out of God

On my recent visit to Manteca to speak to Stanislaw Humanists about the resurrection, we had a bit of drama with some local church members.  When I arrived at the library to speak, there were 300 or so people assembled outside for a counter-protest/prayer vigil/religious service.  They had a P.A. system set up, were playing music, praying, passing out food, and so on.  During my talk, among other things, they encircled the building, held hands, and prayed fervently about what was going on inside.  A number of them sat through my talk and asked some questions after.  A couple of self-described “security” guys came in and out during the talk, had intense conversations on radio headsets, and scowled at me while I talked.  A number of them lurked outside the open door to the lecture hall and listened.  I invited them to come in and sit down, but they refused.  Some others who were passing by shouted into the room later in the talk.  And when I walked back to my car at the end of the night, a car full of people followed me slowly and finally drove off when I got in my car and started it. 

Here’s a video of the talk:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RGbv8-tVJCM

(Inexplicably, YouTube won't let me embed this one.)  

In a video of their sermon the week before, one of the pastor’s said, “We must drive back this demonic attack from our city” language during the prayer.  And also note the territorial language in their characterization of my visit. 

There’s a lot to comment on here.  But I want to focus on a particular issue that’s been on my mind.  Let’s talk on a meta-level about what’s going on when someone like me tries to give a carefully reasoned argument for why someone like the believers who showed up to my talk should stop believing. 

First, the Salem Witch Trials argument that I’ve been presenting for some years now, and in my book, is, as far as I can tell, a devastating argument against anyone who thinks that there is adequate historical evidence to justify believing in the resurrection.  No false modesty here.  The point is that if the really sketchy historical information we have about Jesus warrants concluding that he was resurrected, then the evidence we have concerning witchcraft at Salem, which is vastly better by any measure of quantity and quality, warrants us in concluding that there were really witches at Salem.  But, of course, there was no magic at Salem.  So we should reject both.  There are lots more details about this argument in my book. 

But here’s what I want to get to.  First, this sort of argument has almost no effect on the majority of believers who hear it.  That is due, in large part to motivated reasoning.  This is a well-studied proclivity in humans to acquire a belief, and then evaluate all new information they encounter in ways to make it conform to that belief.  Preference inconsistent information is critically evaluated with much more sever skepticism, and preference consistent information is accepted with much less critical scrutiny.  That is, if it’s not what we want to hear, we figure out some hyper-critical way to find flaws in it and reject it.  We all do it about lots of topics.  My book full of skeptical arguments about Jesus, not surprisingly, has brought motivated reasoners out in droves. 

These days, I find the base phenomena of motivated reasoning and the psychology of belief more interesting than actually engaging in the philosophical debate over that Salem argument.  The Salem argument is a slam dunk, as I see it.  The only question that remains is, what are the real reasons, psychological, social, personal, and neurobiological, that it just bounces off of so many believers? 

One of the reactions in Manteca got my attention.  Someone said something like this, “He’s making this argument comparing Jesus to the Salem Witch Trials or some nonsense, and he thinks that Jesus wasn’t real. [That wasn’t my argument, of course]. But we all know because of the presence of Jesus in our lives, and because of what we’ve seen God do that God is real and Jesus is his one true son. . . .  “ 

So I want to talk about that part:  the body of evidence that folks like the ones who showed up for my talk, take to be resounding proof of God.  I’m going to speculate a bit about what that is. 

First, this group of believers, like many in the U.S., is highly adept at getting themselves into a state of religious ecstasy, for lack of a better term.  Watch this bit of video, shot by local activist Dan Pemberton, of them praying.

Note the swaying, waving of hands, eyes closed, speaking in tongues, moral elevation, and altered state of consciousness in many of them.  And notice how quickly and easily they can slip into this state as they work themselves up.  There are some very powerful feelings surging through people here.  Undeniably uplifting, positive feelings of elation, transcendence, connection with something larger, and so on.  Psychologist Jonathan Haidt and others have called something like this moral elevation: 

http://www.psych-it.com.au/Psychlopedia/article.asp?id=262

But I think what’s going on here also merges on to religious ecstasy:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_ecstasy

Ok, so let’s take a believer and take the sum of all these ecstatic moments that she’s had as a part of her evidence.  What else is there? 

There’s probably also a number of cases where she’s prayed fervently for something—for a loved one to get better from illness, for someone to overcome drug addiction, for guidance about some important decision, and so on—and then as she sees it, later, the outcome she prayed for happened.  A loved one got over an illness, someone recovered from drug addiction, etc. 

What else?  All of her friends and family believe fervently.  They are utterly convinced.  God existence and God’s presence in their lives is an obvious truth to them.  The fact that so many people around her, including lots of people whose judgment she trusts, itself is a part of her evidence.  It’s part of what’s leading her to believe.  And this makes perfect sense.  We all look to the people around us for guidance about what to believe. 

So what would be required to bring someone like this around?  Importantly, a person who believes needs to care about believing reasonably, they need to care about the evidence, they must have as a priority something like Hume’s principle:  Believe all and only those things that are best supported by the evidence.  And believe them with a conviction that commensurate to the quality and quantity of evidence in your possession.  And make a concerted effort to gather all the relevant evidence (pro and con) that time, resources, and prioritization requires.  Call this set of priorities a Rationality Principle. 

Obviously, the Rationality Principle is huge.  Lots of people don’t have it as a priority.  Lots of people don’t understand parts of it.  And lots of people fail to see how central it is to their achieving lots of their goals.  So a real discussion with a believer that has the goal of getting them to not believe may just turn into a broader, and more fundamental discussion of why she ought to adopt or care about this principle. 

Next?  Well, it’s important to note, I think, that our hypothetical believer here has a lot of what we should call evidence.  She has a number of observations, experiences, events in her life, and a lot of information that is relevant to whether God is real.  And as she sees it, that information all points towards the God conclusion.  So if we can assume that she holds the Rationality Principle, then we’ve got to address this body of evidence.  We’ve got to look at the ecstatic experiences, the “answered prayers,” the community belief, and the rest, and we’ve got to figure out what the best explanation of all of that is.  God’s existence is a possible explanation, but it’s pretty clearly not the best explanation.  But convincing someone of that is the hard part.  A nice, short analysis of a reasoning mistake that is often made about prayer is in this video:   

The problem with this piece that that the writing and the tone here is inflammatory.  Even though he’s making a set of very good points about how prayer is set up to be non-disconfirmable, he does it in a way that will offend people and obscure the message. 

What about the religious ecstasy?  I have a number of ideas about what might put those experiences into a larger, natural context for people.  They are common in lots of human religions, including ones that make contrary claims to Christianity.  So one person arguing for God on the basis of her ecstatic experiences is faced with millions of other people having just the same sorts of experiences but taking them to imply that the opposite is true.  People also have these experiences, or something very close to them, at Justin Bieber concerts, during football games, when the national anthem is played, during chick flicks, and so on.  They are common, easily induced naturally, and we don’t have any substantial reason to think that the best explanation here is supernatural. 

What about the community believer evidence?  Education is the best key here.  Manteca, for instance, is an isolated, rural town.  Lots of the people there who got sucked into that church at an early age have never seen or considered the alternatives.  They’ve never been around non-believers.  They know very little about other religious movements, religious history, or the broader context of human religious belief.  Learning the basics about worldwide religious movements puts human religiousness into context, and usually suggests a natural, rather than a supernatural explanation.  The Internet will save us, I think.  It is democratizing information for humanity in a way that has never occurred in history.  A massive flood of information is available to a greater portion of people on the planet every day.  And at the end of the day, the more someone like the people in Manteca, or someone in backwater village in India, knows about what other people out there in the world think, they more they will put 2 and 2 together.  In a few generations, religiousness, especially the worst, most dangerous parts of it, will drop dramatically.  Daniel Dennett is good on this point here:

So there’s a sketch of what I think is going on in the head of a subset of American Christian believers.  That’s an enumeration of their evidence, and some rough suggestions about what it will take to win them, or more likely, their children or their grandchildren over. 

Thoughts?  

Bias Against Atheists

Very interesting study forthcoming from Jennifer Wright, Psychology, College of Charleston, and Ryan Nichols, Philosophy, CSU Fullerton:

How Perceived Religiosity Influences Moral Appraisal:  The Social Cost of Atheism

Abstract:  Social psychologists have found that stereotypes correlate with moral judgments about agents and actions. The most commonly studied stereotypes studied are race/ethnicity and gender. But atheists compose another stereotype, one with its own ignominious history in the Western world, and yet, about which very little is known. This project endeavored to further our understanding of atheism as a social stereotype. Specifically, we tested whether people with non-religious commitments were stereotypically viewed as less moral than people with religious commitments. We found that participants‘ (both Christian and atheist) moral appraisals of atheists were more negative than those of Christians who performed the same moral and immoral actions. They also reported immoral behavior as more (internally and externally) consistent for atheists, and moral behavior more consistent for Christians. The results contribute to research at the intersection of moral theory, moral psychology, and psychology of religion.

Coming out in Journal of Cognition and Culture.  Available on Google Scholar now here.

Talk for the Stanislaus Humanists, Manteca, Wed. Jan. 15, 8:00pm, Manteca Library, 320 Center Street

Believe in Witchcraft?  Believe in the Resurrection?

Problems with Cosmological and Kalam Arguments

Due to his tenacity, and enormous popularity with Christian apologists, William Lane Craig gets a lot of attention for his arguments for God.  Here's an explanation of his Kalam argument, and secondly, a discussion of several serious problems that cripple it.

Objections to the Kalam argument and Cosmological arguments in general:

The Salem Witchcraft Argument Against the Resurrection of Jesus

A video lecture of my Salem Witch Trials argument:

Are Religious Utterances Non-Cognitive? Do they mean anything at all?

Here's my lecture about Antony Flew's Parable of the Invisible Gardener and some speculations about understand religious utterances as non-cognitive.

Witness of the Flying Spaghetti Monster

Craig, Plantinga, and others have said that the Witness of the Holy Spirit is such a powerful, immediate, and veridical feeling, it provides them with an intrinsic defeater defeater to any counter evidence that might come up that suggests that their God view is not correct.

I thought and prayed about it all day today, and I am now having my own special witness in my heart that is informing me about a transcendental reality.  In fact, my experience of the Witness of the Flying Spaghetti Monster in my heart is so powerful, it gives me an intrinsic defeater defeater defeater to their Jesus beliefs.

My point is this.  When confronted with the possibility that there could be evidence that would undermine his conclusion that the Christian God exists, or that Jesus Christ is the savior of humanity, William Lane Craig has said that the witness of the Holy Spirit is so powerful and so assuring, and he's so utterly convinced of its veracity, that he has a built in, intrinsic defeater.  Prior to even confronting that evidence, Craig has announced that nothing could convince him that he's made a mistake.  Furthermore, his access to this special witness of the Holy Spirit is something private that he feels inside his head.  How does he know that this special feeling can be trusted?  Because it is a very powerful feeling that inspires complete trust in him.  How does he know that this feeling is more than just a feeling, it is a reliable indicator of the truth outside of his head?  The feeling is a very powerful, assuring feeling that it is accurate about the truth outside of his head.  Craig's feeling is the measure of its own reliability, hence "intrinsically justifying" is just a distracting way to say his reasoning is utterly circular.

The point of the Flying Spaghetti Monster Witness example is to show just how ludicrous this story is.  What's to keep every other believer in other incompatible divine beings from announcing the same?  And what standard would those of us who don't have the feeling use to judge between these reports?  If I'm having this feeling, and feels like it's authentic, is that sufficient to establish that it is?  Of course not.  What if the ardent Spaghetti follower announces that his feeling not only informs him about the authenticity of the FSM, but it also informs him, intrinsically, and incorrigibly, that anyone else who claims to have a intrinsically justifying Witness belief in any other God is wrong?  The FSM voice in his head tells him, "If anyone says he's got an intrinsic defeater defeater for his belief, don't worry.  I'm giving you an intrinsic defeater defeater defeater, so you can rest assured that you're believing in the one true divine being and all of the rest of them are deluded."

Craig's witness of the Holy Spirit justification for theism, and his intrinsic defeater defeater response to objections is complete silliness obscured by pseudo-epistemological jargon.

Problems with Faith

I've been developing an online Philosophy of Religion course.  This is one of the lecture/videos I created recently for it.  A discussion of the problems with Craig's view on faith.

The Holocaust of Children

I just discovered the work of sociologist Gregory Paul.

THEODICY’S PROBLEM: A STATISTICAL LOOK AT THE HOLOCAUST OF THE CHILDREN, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF NATURAL EVIL FOR THE FREE WILL AND BEST OF ALL WORLDS HYPOTHESES.  After devising some estimates of how many people have suffering and died in human history, hHe argues, among other things, that given the rate of deaths and suffering for prenatal children, infants, and children in history, the world could hardly be worse and sustain life at all.  It is, apparently, the worst, or nearly the worst, of all possible worlds.  Therefore, theism fails.  Very interesting paper.

More of his work here:  http://gspaulscienceofreligion.com/gsptecharticles.html

Podcast: Jesus, Salem, Philosophy of Religion, and Teaching Atheism

I recently did an interview with the guys at NonTheology.  The podcast with some more information is here:
http://nontheology.com/2013/10/27/episode-35-jesus-v-salem-with-dr-matt-mccormick/

Take a look at the rest of their blog too.  Lots of interesting stuff there.

I just came across this older piece by Richard Dawkins about memes.  I don't recall reading it before, although he's presented the idea in several places.  This is an especially rhetorically effective piece:

Viruses of the Mind