tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post6455836745013022893..comments2023-10-20T02:08:39.524-07:00Comments on Atheism: Proving The Negative: The Forbidden ConclusionMatt McCormickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17071078570021986664noreply@blogger.comBlogger36125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-77441732131987911082009-11-04T20:14:38.050-08:002009-11-04T20:14:38.050-08:00I like this piece.
this sentence:
There are other...I like this piece.<br /><br />this sentence:<br />There are other sources of cognitive tension. Some groups of propositions are probabilistically contradictory--one asserts what another declares to be exceedingly improbable. If I won the lottery three days in a row, it would strike me as exceedingly improbable that the lottery was really a fair, million to one game. <br />Reminds me of the first scene in the fantastic Tom Stoppard play, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead. After spinning ninety odd heads in a row, Guildenstern (or Rosencrantz?) is starting to have his faith in the laws of probability tested. His companion can't see a problem with it. <br /><br />A play (and movie) worth seeing.Deloceanohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04954222195147605379noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-27049152181004365632009-07-19T04:25:16.678-07:002009-07-19T04:25:16.678-07:00最近TVや雑誌で紹介されている家出掲示板では、全国各地のネットカフェ等を泊り歩いている家出娘のメッセ...最近TVや雑誌で紹介されている家出掲示板では、全国各地のネットカフェ等を泊り歩いている家出娘のメッセージが多数書き込みされています。彼女たちはお金がないので掲示板で知り合った男性の家にでもすぐに泊まりに行くようです。あなたも書き込みに返事を返してみませんか家出http://ruby.iwatukisan.netnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-47541536800049882772009-07-17T08:02:15.330-07:002009-07-17T08:02:15.330-07:00最近仕事ばかりで毎日退屈してます。そろそろ恋人欲しいです☆もう夏だし海とか行きたいな♪ k.c.07...最近仕事ばかりで毎日退屈してます。そろそろ恋人欲しいです☆もう夏だし海とか行きたいな♪ k.c.0720@docomo.ne.jp 連絡待ってるよ☆メル友募集noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-28709912358545564342009-07-06T06:50:25.889-07:002009-07-06T06:50:25.889-07:00みんなの精神年齢を測定できる、メンタル年齢チェッカーで秘められた年齢がズバリわかっちゃう!かわいいあ...みんなの精神年齢を測定できる、メンタル年齢チェッカーで秘められた年齢がズバリわかっちゃう!かわいいあの子も実は精神年齢オバサンということも…合コンや話のネタに一度チャレンジしてみよう精神年齢http://new.haaaasagasou.netnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-38090558777622610532009-07-04T05:38:22.702-07:002009-07-04T05:38:22.702-07:00さあ、今夏も新たな出会いを経験してみませんか?当サイトは円助交際の逆、つまり女性が男性を円助する『逆...さあ、今夏も新たな出会いを経験してみませんか?当サイトは円助交際の逆、つまり女性が男性を円助する『逆円助交際』を提供します。逆円交際を未経験の方でも気軽に遊べる大人のマッチングシステムです。年齢上限・容姿・経験一切問いません。男性の方は無料で登録して頂けます。貴方も新たな出会いを経験してみませんか逆円助http://new.googlejuku-navi.netnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-24170044015099376222009-05-04T13:39:00.000-07:002009-05-04T13:39:00.000-07:00Mike,
To presume our brains work with bivalence i...Mike,<br /><br />To presume our brains work with bivalence is a pretty big presumption. There is absolutely no reason I can see why we ought to (epistemic norm) semantically qualify our propositions with the law of non-contradiction. There is absolutely no reason I can see why our brains would (empirically) qualify our propositions with the law of non-contradiction.<br /><br />It just does not make sense as an empirical fact, nor be logically necessary. Hell, we can reason with fuzzy logic just fine, much less with a trivalent logic. <br /><br />Now, it might be true that we categorize classes of propositions so that the law of non-contradiction holds at the level of those generalizations or more general statements, but then those would be classes of propositions. By these classes I mean that they are higher-order objects than the propositions or the details of their content themselves. Think of the difference between atomic particles or chemical compounds to their aggregate as some sort of object we experience like a table or water. The properties of the aggregate are clearly not those of the lower-level substances.<br /><br />The analog is that our propositions can work in much the same way. We can have a whole host of relations around our propositions that do not operate with bivalence, but we can class them together (make more compound statements or generate terms as composite of other terms and meanings) in ways such that our propositions emerge to be more "simple" and obtain the law of non-contradiction.<br /><br />One way to recognize this is to consider that in just about any proposition, short of being an analytic tautology, every word in our speech act will have "deeper meaning" that we can break down. In that sort of reduction we are doing precisely what I was getting at in the analog.<br /><br />Of course this doesn't mean there is a clear objective separation between these classes and some supposed "bottom level" of semantical content. The point is that our statements generally can be broken down to the point that what was said only obtains a bivalent truth condition when we remove the vagueness of the semantic content at the reduction by moving up in the propositional class. It would be precisely the class at which the semantical content has become bivalent by ignoring the variation in terms or vagaries that cause a separation from bivalence. <br /><br />(Noting that fuzzy logic is the idea of capturing "vagueness" in terms. Though, we certainly do not need to go as far as a continuum of truth values, we might suppose at some "bottom level" all terms end up that vague or at least are presupposed to certain degrees in that kind of "hierarchy" we might imagine.)<br /><br /><br />So, to your point about accidental knowledge. I don't know if the Gettier problem fully applies here because the issue wasn't so much that someone "got it right on accident" and then we question whether he really knew what he claimed to know. The person can be considered justified in their belief, but what is lacking is the information that ties certain propositions or terms together with other information. If we find that to be 'accidental' then we would have to make almost every bit of knowledge fall under a Gettier problem, because it is so generic--so broad--a use that unless we had absolute knowledge, then we are always having gaps or missing information or missing relations between propositions and semantic content that we could be misinformed. <br /><br /><br />I would propose a more abstract model of what is going on like this:<br /><br />x believes that P, where P obtains when the set {a, b, c, ..., p} is satisfied. In other words, x has a belief about P <I>because</I> x has some stance affirming a, b, c, ... and p. The degree of <I>strength</I> that he asserts these propositions varies. For instance, x might strongly believe that P while only weakly believing that p.<br /><br />Also, x believes that ¬Q, where Q={a', b', c', ..., ¬q}. <br /><br />What is not known to the person is that we have a translation rule φ:Q→P, by translating each element in Q one-one to each element in P. Of particular interest here is that "φ(q)=p". Thus, since x does not know or does not believe that φ, x does not know that he believes ¬p and p. We might also say that the <I>strength</I> of these assertions carries over. Thus, if we want to give an arbitrary quantification, we might say x believes that p with 0.2 confidence. Also, x believes that ¬q with 0.6 confidence. Thus, unknown to x, x believes that ¬p, by φ(¬q)=¬p, with 0.6 confidence.<br /><br />This model can provide us with some semblance of how non-contradiction will fail because we're not dealing with bivalence. In fact, we're dealing with inductive reasoning and can use a number of logical frameworks for this (such as fuzzy, where we can group propositions with a characteristic function detailing their relative confidence in the set--though, I presumed the translation carries over the same confidence, it does not need to since it is in a new set, i.e., it went from 0.6 in Q to something else in P).<br /><br />Also, it is not particularly a gettier problem because x's belief is justified to a <I>degree</I> of confidence--however we measure it. Furthermore, x's belief is not justified incorrectly. It is justified! The problem is lacking other relevant information, such as a translation rule for knowing that q in Q is equivalent to p in P (by an injective transformation from Q to P). x is justified for the belief that p and the belief that ¬q, but x is not believing one of those, but being mistaken about that belief. The mistake is in supposing there is no translation equating them or that they say approximately the same thing.<br /><br />What we can argue is that x has a skewed view of reality by not understanding these relation between P and Q, and in talking about P and Q in general, as a higher-order class, we can talk about them with bivalence and get rid of all the vagaries of p and q. Thus, we might say that x believes that P and believes that Q, but Q, in all relevant points here, is equivalent to ¬P. We can make this generalization iff we know that all relevant model (interpretations) of P do not satisfy Q. In that respect, we can then solve the dilemma, i believe, and reintroduce bivalence. Of course, to make that move requires a lot of qualification, and recognizing the missing information that causes the mistake. Without it, we have nothing, and one is justified in their skewed view of reality. Thus, recognizing a mistake leads to correcting the skewness.Bryan Goodrichhttp://bryangoodrich.xanga.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-85408509396400481412009-05-03T03:35:00.000-07:002009-05-03T03:35:00.000-07:00Eeeep, by Alsten, I mean Gettier. =p.Eeeep, by Alsten, I mean Gettier. =p.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-18783396414462997652009-05-03T03:07:00.000-07:002009-05-03T03:07:00.000-07:00I would say that what MM is trying to explain is t...I would say that what MM is trying to explain is that the mind has an intuitive sense of the law of non-contradiction (at the risk of putting words in his mouth). In order to know anything, we must be capable of sorting propositions in our current consciousness into their property category. The ability to discern between p and ~p then is fundamental to our minds ability to sort said propositions/information.<br /><br />You might also note the "accidental nature" of Kripke's case, which can well be characterized by Alsten's critique of justified beliefs and cast light on by the series of papers which followed attempting to explain this (such as those by Goldman). <br /><br />Instead, try to focus on the point that in order to sort information we must be able to sort between P & ~P, this is the only point that is required for the above assertions.Mike :Dnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-63912169953335677652009-04-18T16:42:00.000-07:002009-04-18T16:42:00.000-07:00Anon,
That depends on what we mean by intension. ...Anon,<br /><br />That depends on what we mean by intension. Intensional content is provided -in the same language- while what we have in Kripke's example is two different languages. The assumption is that any <A HREF="http://bryangoodrich.xanga.com/696956275/model-theory-an-example/" REL="nofollow">model</A> for a given sentence requires that the <A HREF="http://bryangoodrich.xanga.com/697174477/understanding-logic-structures/" REL="nofollow">structure</A> shares the same language for which the sentence is uttered (or is a wff).<br /><br />The two statements are not extensionally the same because they come under two different languages. However, the difference is that there is a translation from one language (<A HREF="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formal_system" REL="nofollow">formal system</A>) to another. Likewise, we can transfer (by, say, a <A HREF="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Homomorphism" REL="nofollow">homomorphism</A>) the model of one language to another and maintain the truth of the sentence between languages. <br /><br />The problem is you're assuming the disquotational property. While useful, I think it is utterly lacking. I bring that up in my <A HREF="http://bryangoodrich.xanga.com/696867045/truth-is-not-a-property/" REL="nofollow">truth blog</A>.<br /><br />Disquotation: "p" is true iff p<br /><br />There is no scientifically sound basis for this rule that if one "assents that p" and "'p' is true in some language L", then one "believes that 'p'" Why?<br /><br />The reason is that "assent" and "belief" are non-truth functional as well as not even scientifically founded, and yet we're making empirical claims with these logical statements. If we view it purely abstracted, though, there is no basis for some metalogical principle like that.<br /><br />One error in it is that "p" may be constructed in L, but "q" is constructed in L*. While p=q intensionally (and we have two models M and M* which satisfy them in L and L*, respectively), there is no reason to suppose that one's assent to q and assent to ¬p should pose a problem. The reason is that the person <I>never assents to p</I>. Therefore, even on the same principle it does not apply, but we still haven't qualified what this "assent" relation or operation is. <br /><br /><br />Therefore, the confusion only arises in what one assents to. However, as I said, this is a language issue, not a logical issue. Assent in this case is immediately adjoined to the semantics because as the principle was even used it basically says "if one assents to p then there is a model for 'p'" where 'p' is comprised of the language the person understands that p. You cannot really separate assent to p and belief in "p" without the language for which p is described. Now, a person may understand more than one language, and can easily translate between L and L*, but if they do not, or only have a partial understanding, then that is the error. It is still semantical because the assent and semantics are intertwined. The issue is in the language and what one assents to in a language. <br /><br />If we are to take anything important here, it is however you qualify assent, you need to make it language-contextualized otherwise you'll get a lot of nonsense, because you'll take the semantics and statements and "move them around" as if they were independent of the language when clearly they are not.Bryan Goodrichhttp://bryangoodrich.xanga.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-28870309793058656732009-04-18T00:30:00.000-07:002009-04-18T00:30:00.000-07:00Nice well thought out response Bryan. However, Kri...Nice well thought out response Bryan. However, Kripke's dilemma differs from previous semantic dilemmas in that the properties of the two beliefs are identical in extension and intension. whereas Superman = Clark kent are two beliefs that are not intensionally and extensionally the same. Quine showed this the case in his <br />solution to a previous semantic dilemma that I cant recall the name - it has to do with a spy and a guy he know's or something...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-35112020926734270492009-04-18T00:21:00.000-07:002009-04-18T00:21:00.000-07:00MATT SAID:
"Anonymous, the alleged contradictory ...MATT SAID:<br /><br />"Anonymous, the alleged contradictory belief account you cite says that IF Kripke's account is correct, then Pierre believes a contradiction. The simple way to answer this is just to assert that Kripke's account of beliefs is not correct, and I wouldn't be alone in doing that"<br /><br />Right, you wouldn’t be alone. Just about every philosophy student who first encounters this puzzle makes the same claim. However this doesn’t buy you much credibility as a philosophy professor.<br /><br />There is a gang of philosophers who have pondered over Kripke's dilemma and they aren't beginning Phil students.<br /><br />It is also self refuting and senseless to claim that a person cant have a belief that they know is false. This is nothing more than expressing the law of exclusive middle in a linguistic utterance other than its raw form.<br /><br />A lecture from Philosophy of language course:<br /><br />"""The well known puzzle is based on the assumption that our speaker is normal non omniscient, sincere, reflective and not conceptually confused. The two principles used are the Disquotational Principle (DP) and the Translation Principle (TP):<br /><br />DP<br />If a speaker of a language L assents to p and "p" is a sentence of L, then he believes that p.<br /><br />TP<br />If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that language, <br />then any translation of it into another language also expresses a truth in that other language<br /><br />Pierre, a Frenchman, heard in Paris about London's beuty. He therefore assents to the sentence: <br /><br />(1) Londres est jolie.<br /><br /><br />Emigrated in England he learns English by exposure, takes up residence in London and, after observing the surroundings, he assents to:<br /><br />(2) London is not pretty<br /><br />He does not realize that the town where he lives is the town depicted in the nice pictures he saw in Paris; he has not updated his earlier belief expressed once as "Londres est jolie". Then, given that "Londres" and "London" (just as the old-fashioned "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus") have the same reference - or the same semantic value (the object referred to by the names which are rigid designators), it follows that Pierre believes that London is pretty and he believes that London is not pretty.<br />A similar puzzle may arise also with the homophonic case, when Pierre meets on two occasions Paderewski, once in a music hall and another time at a political conference. He does not realize that he met the same person and he assents to two different sentence:<br />Paderewski has musical talent<br />Paderewski has no musical talent<br /><br />In both cases, we are compelled to admit that this supposed rational person holds contradictory beliefs, therefore this person is not as rational as supposed. Is it a real puzzle? If it is, either we have to reject the causal theory of reference, or we have to find an answer to the puzzle. Some answers could say that if the puzzle works, then it is worse for the causal theory of reference. A more precise answer could be that, as in the case of the reductio ad absurdum of Mill's theory via the traditional argument, we may have a reductio ad absurdum criticizing the validity of the disquotational principle. Beyond the difficulty of abandoning an apparent acceptable principle, it has been suggested (by Sosa) that even that principle may be dispensable in building up the puzzle. Before rejecting such a principle, or rejecting the causal theory of reference, it should be shown that other theories can solve the puzzle. <br />But it is not so clear that a descriptive theory of reference can do better. A Fregean could say that the contents of Pierre's beliefs (thoughts) are senses: the way in which London is presented to Pierre the first time fits with the way in which the concept "pretty" is given; the way in which London is presented to Pierre the second time does not fit. This could be correct. The problem is that we have no idea of what these "modes of presentations" are. We could try something like this: " Pierre believes that the town depicted in a nice picture he heard about in Paris is pretty" and "Pierre believes that the town he lives in is not pretty". Even given these expressions, we cannot avoid the fact that in both cases Pierre believes of London that it is pretty, and he believes of the same town that it is not pretty."""<br /><br /><br />http://www.dif.unige.it/epi/hp/penco/pub/kpuz.htmAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-635205022620490132009-04-16T22:38:00.000-07:002009-04-16T22:38:00.000-07:00The problem is not epistemological. Kripke is show...The problem is not epistemological. Kripke is showing a semantic weakness in certain logics, especially when it comes to names and reference. One can have a referent explaining certain semantic properties one accepts, like "Clark Kent is a dork." On the other hand, he might have a certain referent explaining other semantic properties he accepts, like "Superman is not a dork." The problem is in trying to evaluate the semantics extensionally because it just so happens that "Clark Kent" is the same person as "Superman" and yet we do not have "x is a dork" and "x is not a dork" because the referents are different to the person and their beliefs.<br /><br />I agree with Searle's speech acts approach to this, and we have to assess the reference to the person that is uttering it, or at the very least obtains said intentional stance. There are other logics, e.g., <A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-intensional/" REL="nofollow">intensional logic</A>, which deal with these kinds of issues since classical logics have no way to address them. <br /><br />The point is that the contradiction comes as a semantical contradiction and not any sort of real (or ontological) contradiction, i.e., London is not, in fact, beautiful and not beautiful no more than the sun exists and the sun does not exist. The issue is whether or not the belief in said facts of the matter are taken to be semantically <A HREF="http://bryangoodrich.xanga.com/696867045/truth-is-not-a-property/" REL="nofollow">true</A> or not. <br /><br />I would say that the problem is simply resolved, say in the Clark Kent/Superman case, or any other intensional conflicting case, by showing that there does not exist a <A HREF="http://bryangoodrich.xanga.com/696956275/model-theory-an-example/" REL="nofollow">model</A> which satisfies both statements at the same time, i.e., we do not have the intensional content or interpretation or model that makes semantically true--at the same time--both X and ¬X, even if independently the intensional content may be the same thing.<br /><br />Can people hold (semantically) contradictory beliefs? Sure, because they're ignorant about certain intensional relations that would be weeded out with an adequately robust intensional logic that addresses those relations. One simple "trick" is to see if it is possible to interpret extensionally. In the case of Superman/Kent, we know that is not the case, because if we treated them both, as they really are, the same person, we do not keep the same intensional truth status since then Superman/Kent is both X and ¬X. If someone is ignorant of those relations, however, then they will have contradictory beliefs. As long as there is ignorance there is such a possibility. <br /><br />I pose a more challenging question. How does reasoning under uncertainty provide a basis for saying, as MM does, that holding such contradictory beliefs come as irrational? Such a standard of assessment begs the question. At any given time it only comes up against a set of knowledge we already collectively agree upon and would assess the semantics based on that, but it is never complete, homogeneous in quality nor static. (Ir)rationality is, at best, a relative and fleeting concept.<br /><br />It would be irrational, iff, someone accepts that "x is P" and "x is ¬P" while also understanding that A satisfies the first statement, B satisfies the second statement and "A=B". But we don't know the status of that last condition which is absolutely the condition which would make or break this status. Thus, we have propositional content P and we have models, M, which may satisfy those statements P. But they are always going to be interpreted based on certain conditions C. Thus, we cannot just look at if "M ╞ P" but need it to be "{M,C} ╞ P". There's heavier concepts I could introduce, but they get far more abstract than needed, and the notation required to make it easier is not exactly "nice" in ASCII or anything blogger would permit. <br /><br />I recommend my truth blog linked above, since it is general enough to apply.Bryan Goodrichhttp://bryangoodrich.xanga.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-66493261301229009842009-04-16T19:41:00.000-07:002009-04-16T19:41:00.000-07:00Anonymous, the alleged contradictory belief accoun...Anonymous, the alleged contradictory belief account you cite says that IF Kripke's account is correct, then Pierre believes a contradiction. The simple way to answer this is just to assert that Kripke's account of beliefs is not correct, and I wouldn't be alone in doing that, and then we don't have a problem. Furthermore, if the alleged contradictory belief story is misrepresenting Kripke's view, then it also won't work. It's also easy enough to say that Pierre has got one thing in mind when he is thinking that London is not beautiful, and that he has another in mind when he is thinking about the French sentence. My claim is that people cannot simultaneously belief something and believe that denial, as they grasp the claim and its denial, at the same time. <br /><br />But I'm actually not especially wedded to the point. If it turns out that in some circumstances we have convincing empirical evidence that people do believe contradictions, then I'd just accept that. The point, of course, would be that they SHOULDN'T because doing so is irrational. Surely you don't think that's especially controversial. And the real point of the post, which you're not really addressing, isn't about whether or not people believe contradictions. <br /><br />MMMatt McCormickhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17071078570021986664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-75334089203334116152009-04-16T17:18:00.000-07:002009-04-16T17:18:00.000-07:00ketan I don't think you understand the dilemma. Sa...ketan I don't think you understand the dilemma. Saul Kriptke struggled with providing a solution to Pierre having contradictory beliefs. Pierre has absolutely a basis for his contradictory beliefs i might add...<br /><br />Gawd where's that bryan guy who understands logic here i am sure he can explain what's going on...Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-81286571504068836192009-04-16T01:48:00.000-07:002009-04-16T01:48:00.000-07:00Anonymous, the contradictions you cited could be e...Anonymous, the contradictions you cited could be explained by one simple reason--the boy, in the first place had no basis to believe "Londres est jolie". What mental effort did he put before drawing that conclusion? Had he tried to look up in the map where Londres and London were, he'd have been left with only one conclusion--London (=Londres) is NOT beautiful (as far as his experience would be concerned).<br /><br />Extending this analogy to the question of existence or nonexistence of God, and its nature, looking up a map would be analogous to taking a detached view of one's conclusions. Meaning, trying to look at the Universe (more so the world around) as if from some faraway galaxy, rather than from "within the self". I just hope my last sentence makes sense, if not, the problem is with my explanatory power. When one is able to do this, duality of possible conclusions (about the SAME Universe) will become apparent, and one would supplant the other, for it would provide a comprehensive, and consistent account of the Universe.<br /><br />*Universe=everything that verifiably lends itself to human perception.<br /><br />Take care.Ketanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02622410643454108685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-56771451087497290962009-04-15T22:47:00.000-07:002009-04-15T22:47:00.000-07:00"Human beings are psychologically incapable of sim..."Human beings are psychologically incapable of simultaneously holding two contradictory propositions in mind at once and having an attitude of assent or belief towards both of them"<br /><br />I think this may be false...<br /><br />"""Kripke invites us to imagine a French, monolingual boy, Pierre, who believes the following: “Londres est jolie.” (“London is beautiful.”) Pierre moves to London without realising that London = Londres. He then learns English the same way a child would learn the language, that is, not by translating words from French to English. Pierre learns the name “London” from the unattractive part of the city he lives in, so he comes to believe that London is not beautiful. If Kripke’s account is correct Pierre now believes both that London is beautiful and that London is not beautiful. This cannot be explained by coreferring names having different semantic properties. According to Kripke, this shows that attributing additional semantic properties to names, will not explain what it is supposed to explain."""<br />http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saul_KripkeAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-65929880678562513652009-04-15T11:53:00.000-07:002009-04-15T11:53:00.000-07:00Considering the first sentence your almost right. ...Considering the first sentence your almost right. Those who have had their corpus callosum "Split-Brain" patients. cut tend to have P on one lobe while having a ~P on the other. A good one is "I'm Male" on the right hemi, and an "I'm female" on the other hemi - in some experiments. <br /><br />Your right if we consider people in those cases to have become two people in one body after the operation.Jonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02877962468047811190noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-10303849873238567272009-04-10T11:33:00.000-07:002009-04-10T11:33:00.000-07:00Matt, are you on reddit? If so, I want to friend y...Matt, are you on reddit? If so, I want to friend you. If not, sign up real quick and I will friend you. :)Lukehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/12968634190280933116noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-56009672257085687012009-04-07T23:00:00.000-07:002009-04-07T23:00:00.000-07:00Matt,I'll reiterate that I don't know squat about ...Matt,<BR/><BR/>I'll reiterate that I don't know squat about philosophy, but you'll really get flak for asserting that human action is about brain states?<BR/><BR/>Fascinating. You and Eric got me reading Quine, and the the most striking thing I'm getting from it is, why is this this guy arguing so hard for what the evidence dictates (then I remind myself he was writing decades ago)?<BR/><BR/>I guess I have hard time understanding why people view neuroscience so differently from chemistry or physics. Given it is a younger specialty, but with that comes the advantage of being able to build on an already existing well developed framework.<BR/><BR/>Originally I felt surprised that I hadn't come across Quine as a philosopher of science. The more I have read, I no longer feel surprised. He wasn't a philosopher of science, he was scientist of philosophy.<BR/><BR/>So now it's decades later, with confirming data building up day after day, and you're still trying to justify it.<BR/><BR/>O.K., I officially rescind my previous conviction that the philosophers' purpose is only to come to up with the right questions to ask. After those of us in the data collection world find the answers to the questions, philosophers then must explain it to humanity. Upon reviewing the data, that latter function demonstrates itself to be much more difficult.<BR/><BR/>Thank goodness you guys are there (my end is much more fun).M. Tullyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06056410184615941086noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-90202361658751223062009-04-07T22:06:00.000-07:002009-04-07T22:06:00.000-07:00MM,Yeah, that sounds about what I recall seeing. I...MM,<BR/><BR/>Yeah, that sounds about what I recall seeing. I have to disagree with part of your conclusion, however. Eliminative reductions don't seem to make much sense if the manifest entity has an efficacious nature.<BR/><BR/>(e.g., a rainbow is often exampled as a valid elimination because a rainbow has no substantial existence beyond the reduced--what I'll call <A HREF="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/" REL="nofollow">structure</A>--substratum which qualifies the term. On the other hand, people like Searle, which I agree with on this manner, do argue that things like consciousness or intentionality have emergent properties qualified by the very reductions that make the term precise, analogously to how we do not eliminate tables or water for the fact their properties that make them what they are exist entirely in terms of the reduction or reduced structure.)<BR/><BR/>Your conclusion is that the term "belief" doesn't match what our reductive scientific investigations indicate it to be. That simply means our concept is inaccurate, needs refinement and we need a new theory about beliefs. An elimination, as you espoused here, sounds like we're throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The real difference is a difference in description, level of analysis and what I think can be described analogous to <A HREF="http://bryangoodrich.xanga.com/697174477/understanding-logic-structures/" REL="nofollow">structures</A>. <BR/><BR/>I think any meaningful reductionist programme should make clear when and why something should be eliminated, but most meaningful reductions--especially in the sciences--are not eliminative. I would call them symmetrical. Symmetric, in this sense, because the scientific analysis qualifies the emergent descriptions and properties we talk about at a wholly higher level of description.<BR/><BR/>(e.g., we talk about pistons in car engines, and solidity of tables and objects, qua engines and objects, while qualifying those meanings based on the science of their reduced structures and physics, which may depend upon our understanding of unobservables as described by, say, quantum mechanics.)<BR/><BR/>The simple reason I caution against eliminative reductions is that it is the same bias we see when people say that "the natural sciences are more <I>pure</I> than the social sciences" when, point in fact, you will never study economics in terms of physics, chemistry or biology, even though certain facets of behavior are strongly correlated and described by such physical factors. The social sciences are no less "pure" than the natural sciences, it is just a different kind of "critter" to deal with, just as in mathematics we deal with "abstract critters" from the kind, say, biology deals with. It is a difference in content, but not some different ontological kind. There's also a good cartoon that jokes how mathematics is the only real pure science, far removed from even physics!<BR/><BR/>I wont run on the tangent, but there is no fear of introducing any mystical "mind" or social factors which "transcend" reality in any meaningful way. It is simply the way we deal with those objects as those objects and not their component parts--just as the examples parenthesized above. I'll simply add that in that regard this is where I reference a lot about structures, as I have already, because the model of the reduced "level" and the higher "level" do share properties and we can analyze and inform each of the structures by what we discover about one or the other. That would be made possible by some kind of homomorphism between the two structures. Of course, it requires a more precise definition of structure in this ontological sense, what is meant by levels and how to construct and justify said morphisms. However, those are all things needing to be qualified that go far beyond the scope of this comment.Bryan Goodrichhttp://bryangoodrich.xanga.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-5212550214946277432009-04-07T21:58:00.000-07:002009-04-07T21:58:00.000-07:00Wow! I have really learned a lot from all of thes...Wow! I have really learned a lot from all of these comments. Philosophy of mind intrigues me.<BR/><BR/>I agree with Ketan that I have had many restless moments considering a few of the implications under discussion here.<BR/><BR/>This issue is probably the most difficult thing I am facing as a relatively new (within the last year) deconvert from Christianity.<BR/><BR/>What is meaning? What is purpose? What is motivation? What is responsibility? <BR/><BR/>Perhaps these are the wrong questions. Perhaps I have insufficient information. Nevertheless, I eagerly look forward to trying to answer these questions (or any others which may arise) more explicitly.Teleprompterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/13014919684351529479noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-6724384646169406192009-04-07T14:51:00.000-07:002009-04-07T14:51:00.000-07:00Once again, two things more. My name is not "TC" :...Once again, two things more. My name is not "TC" :) . It's a mere acronym I use for "take care". You can all me "Ketan".<BR/><BR/>Second, I'm no longer a deist. I turned an atheist, the moment I realized that the complexity of the Universe was no reason for an intelligent creator to have created it. <BR/><BR/>One last thing, which you may not answer if you find it too personal--why don't you include anything remotely emotional/personal in your blog? It is after all a blog! I for one would be very curious about your intellectual journey from whatever you were to begin with to this rigorous rationalist (being atheist being one of the many consequences of it). Again, I've taken a liberty of dwelling on something personal to you, which I hope doesn't backfire (upset you). TC.Ketanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02622410643454108685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-9796446980074722752009-04-07T14:38:00.000-07:002009-04-07T14:38:00.000-07:00I'll be honest on two counts here--I was pretty su...I'll be honest on two counts here--I was pretty sure of the action potential thing. Just didn't want to sound snobbish.<BR/><BR/>The second thing is harder to be honest about--I thought your comment about "religious implications" had an element of sadistic pleasure, as in the pleasure one gets on knowing they were right and their rival, wrong, but totally forgetting in the process, how much pain the truth could have caused to the one learning the truth de novo. "Sadistic" may not be the most appropriate adjective here, and excuse me for an inability to think of a better one. My reluctance to put this suspicion in perspective should be obvious--I'd be assuming too much about your nature as a person from a mere statement, and accusing someone of deriving a sadistic pleasure is something very serious, and hence wanted to avoid it. But realized because of your pointing out, that in the process, I inadvertantly ended up charging you with something as much, if not more grave (at least to a logician)--of using "only" loosely. I think I made the mistake of reading too much into the concluding lines about religious implications, when possibly you were stating things in a matter-of-factly manner, without any emotion. Sorry, if you felt hurt, and even otherwise for assuming that statements in personal matters like purpose of life and liberty (free will) cannot be made dispassionately. TC.Ketanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02622410643454108685noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-63786904814926799332009-04-07T13:43:00.000-07:002009-04-07T13:43:00.000-07:00TC, I'll assume that you're not merely tempted to ...TC, I'll assume that you're not merely tempted to point out the mistake, but you're actually pointing it out. And you're right. It's "action" not "activation." That was composed in haste. <BR/><BR/>There's a pattern of people misunderstanding a simple point here. If I claim that a study, or argument, or experiment has an implication for religious beliefs, that clearly does not imply that it ONLY has an implication for religious beliefs. I did not say the latter. Look, if I say that winning the lottery is a way to get rich, it isn't an objection to come back with, "But you can get rich through Internet marketing too!" The two claims are obviously compatible. <BR/><BR/>Having taught logic for decades, you won't find me using the term "only" lightly or carelessly unless it's a typo. And in the case in question I didn't use it at all. <BR/><BR/>Thanks. <BR/><BR/>MMMatt McCormickhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17071078570021986664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-83052434593138530972009-04-07T13:32:00.000-07:002009-04-07T13:32:00.000-07:00Matt, I don't disagree at all with what you've ope...Matt, I don't disagree at all with what you've openly speculated to be the nature of what we call beliefs, will, emotions, etc. I'm no expert in psychology/neurology, but what we call the "mind", is not a structure, but a complex FUNCTION of the human brain. In light of the above fact, no wonder, the mind would come to be understood more as a mesh of complex neural networks bathed in chemicals (neurotransmitters and ions) rather than an abstract incomprehensible entity. But where I disagree is that these findings will have implications ONLY on religious beliefs. To think of it, I'd long back drawn the very same (nihilistic--lack of free will, beliefs being nothing but play of chemicals all point to just one thing--lack of extrinsic purpose to life) conclusions that<BR/>you are waiting for neurologists to announce some day.<BR/>I'd concede that that realization was one of the factors in my considering nonexisuence of God. But that made me more of a deist rather than an out and out atheist. Embracing Atheism is more about the courage to accept what one is convinced to be the truth rather than being convinced of the truth (which of course has been the subject of numerous of your posts, and more so the previous one). I'm only trying to say that "such" facts will not just affect those who are religous, but also those who're totally irreligious. Believe me, for me it was much more difficult to accept the possibilities of lack of purpose to life and genuine free will rather than that of a supreme manager and a creator of life. TC.Ketanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/02622410643454108685noreply@blogger.com