tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post4087869503060610392..comments2023-10-20T02:08:39.524-07:00Comments on Atheism: Proving The Negative: Disagreeing about Religious DisagreementsMatt McCormickhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/17071078570021986664noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-88803056565806596852012-07-20T05:26:07.699-07:002012-07-20T05:26:07.699-07:00Why do you call John Mack "infamous"?
H...Why do you call John Mack "infamous"?<br /><br />He had strange ideas, but simply being "strange" does not mean an idea is false. (Although it may have led to his murder.)<br /><br />In fact, I disagree with Mack, but the idea of Aliens visiting the earth is not inherently impossible for any reason I know of.<br /><br />I question if it is even implausible.<br /><br />Certainly no stranger than the "Big Bang", spontaneous genertion, or "multiverses" which seem to be commonly accepted.Morrisonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06137890891223067672noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-50281182697935617442012-06-14T15:45:03.900-07:002012-06-14T15:45:03.900-07:00Sorry about the deleted posts. Blogger said there ...Sorry about the deleted posts. Blogger said there was an error, but was still posting.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-4440952350991404302012-06-14T15:11:24.698-07:002012-06-14T15:11:24.698-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-1848790722775779582012-06-14T15:10:41.076-07:002012-06-14T15:10:41.076-07:00This comment has been removed by the author.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-83960167798913154602012-06-14T15:09:35.562-07:002012-06-14T15:09:35.562-07:00@ Matt H: Epistemic value suspension is exceedingl...@ Matt H: Epistemic value suspension is exceedingly rare, but can happen. Consider a quantum particle with 50% observed locality to the left or right of position X. I say right, you say left, but neither of us is justified. It will be one or the other, and given equally justified sets of premises, adding a proposed locality premise is equally justified by the law of excluded middle since the conclusion "right of x" is as justified as "left of x" in that both imply "right of x or left of x" and are so equally justifiable inferential conclusions formally. However, by far almost everything is not a 50% case. Given the unique epistemic positions of individuals, maintaining skepticism is logically irrational in most scenarios as Dr. McCormick explains. It could be said no such particle exists, but there is not sufficient reason to believe this in that 50% is truly random, and so is implied by quantum indeterminacy as true indeterminacy is predicated on true randomness. This should not be taken as reason to apply skepticism across the board of knowledge (implied by epistemic equality) but only at the edges--as the causal states produced by the 95% likelihood of the big bang are certainties. Following logical similarity I theorize that the remaining 5% translates as skeptical states.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-92065188237463744152012-06-12T03:01:33.791-07:002012-06-12T03:01:33.791-07:00Feldman's framing of "reasonable disagree...Feldman's framing of "reasonable disagreements" seems to rely on symmetry of the existence question.<br /><br />Eg. a 3rd party assessing the guilt of Lefty and Righty (III A).<br /><br />That seems an unsuitable analog. Bi-standers surely see Lefty is contrarian, whereas Righty gnostic. (With evidence merely testamony that his closest neighbours find unconvincing)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-47049763794986526842012-06-09T00:52:00.748-07:002012-06-09T00:52:00.748-07:00Feldman says:
". To defend my atheism, I wou...Feldman says:<br /><br />"<i>. To defend my atheism, I would have to be justified in accepting some hypothesis explaining away religious belief, for example the hypothesis that it arises from some fundamental psychological need. And, while I am inclined to believe some such<br />hypothesis, the more I reflect on it, the more I realize that I am no position to make any such<br />judgment with any confidence at all. Such psychological conjectures are, I must admit, highly<br />speculative, at least when made by me.</i><br /><br />This seems incongruous to me. Does Feldman, in rejecting hypotheses about astrology, Bigfoot, and the magic healing power of crystals have to accept psychological explanations about those beliefs?Matt DeStefanohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14408364244593519914noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-29785358394832667012012-06-08T18:19:36.687-07:002012-06-08T18:19:36.687-07:00Eric,
I think we're in complete agreement, ...Eric,<br /><br /> I think we're in complete agreement, and I bow to your much more clear and concise description.<br /><br />Matt,<br /><br /> I see where he separates pragmatic justification. I'm just not convinced that there's anything left after one does that. That is, I'm having trouble coming up with an actual case. I think, when you strip the agent's attributes down such that all that is left is a rational, epistemic agent, that they cannot reasonably disagree about the value of evidence, nor reach different conclusions. <br /><br />The one exception to my claim would be in a case where, in fact, there is not enough data to lead to a single conclusion. There could be something going on where the gap in evidence is 1. not obvious, and 2. would be the deciding factor between equally compelling conclusions. <br /><br />I guess he's right within his own narrow description, but my view is that it could never happen.<br /><br />Matt HMatthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07068629169998511865noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-53397989125636024402012-06-08T17:01:30.534-07:002012-06-08T17:01:30.534-07:00I suppose I'm a little friendlier toward Feldm...I suppose I'm a little friendlier toward Feldman's position than you, Matt. But maybe only just barely. I have been thinking along lines I think are substantially the same as yours, here.<br /><br />Suppose Tweedle is a prominent theistic philosopher. We can easily concede that Tweedle does not endorse theism because of some lack of rational ability, or because she is ignorant of the field of philosophy of religion, or otherwise epistemically disadvantaged vis-a-vis her identical twin, Twiddle, who happens to be a prominent atheistic philosopher. But suppose Tweedle is married to a theist, belongs to a church where she has a reputation to uphold among friends, and serves as faculty advisor to her college's chapter of Campus Crusade for Christ. Tweedle, therefore has invested quite a bit of her self-image in her role as a theist. That is, there are psycho-social pressures on her to hold beliefs supportive of theism. <br /><br />Now it is possible, of course, that Twiddle likewise is subject to psycho-social pressures to maintain her atheism. But I think that as a matter of empirical fact, theism has such a strong social foothold in most quarters that it may be reasonable to think that Tweedle's theism is more likely to be influenced by psycho-social pressures than Twiddle's atheism.<br /><br />None of this means, of course, that psycho-social pressures can always be invoked to discount one side of a dispute, but there are cases where I think one cannot help but wonder (for example, one might ask why it just so happens that one is much more likely to find arguments against contraception coming from Catholic philosophers than from non-Catholics).Eric Sotnakhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06162425851889399481noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-9228879829580288202012-06-08T09:17:27.184-07:002012-06-08T09:17:27.184-07:00It seems strange to approach religious debates as ...It seems strange to approach religious debates as disputes over specific claims. I can only think of a very few times where I've had a conversation that began with with the theist asserting an intelligible theistic claim.<br /><br />Instead, talk about 'God' seems much more likely to be describing a very malleable intuition.<br /><br />But, as a piece about reasonable disagreement in general, I think your critique is on-point.<br /><br />As much as I'd like to think that my epistemic peers are people who don't make errors, that seems self-serving. I know that I'm subject to bias and must be making some number of mistakes.<br /><br />Once I acknowledge that, it seems easy enough to say, "I believe X. However, conclusion Y could be reached by someone who makes errors about as often as I do."<br /><br />This would neatly distinguish disagreement over some contested scientific theory (small errors would be enough to push someone one way or the other) from astrology (something large has gone wrong).Richardhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/16929722353413887802noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-61169776121322092972012-06-08T08:35:53.177-07:002012-06-08T08:35:53.177-07:00Thanks Matt. Yeah, Feldman brackets off cases of p...Thanks Matt. Yeah, Feldman brackets off cases of pragmatic justification as you suggest. <br />MMatt McCormickhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/17071078570021986664noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8716347331682132223.post-69780072841454841852012-06-07T21:52:57.596-07:002012-06-07T21:52:57.596-07:00I'm going to agree and disagree with your asse...I'm going to agree and disagree with your assessment of the problem. Hopefully in the same sentence.<br /><br />The philosophical drive is truth. Subsequently, when we speak of epistemic agents, we're speaking to an individuals ability to form justified, true, beliefs. <br /><br />I think his use of "epistemic peer" is too limited to discuss the full implications of the problem of disagreement. Consider:<br /><br />Not everyone values truth. There are numerous examples of people holding false beliefs because of their utility to the believer. In short, the beliefs have value, but their value does not come from their truth, but from how they allow the agent to operate in the world.<br /><br />In these cases, I feel his qualifications for an epistemic agent: background information, reasoning/analytical ability, and intelligence, can be satisfied while similar agents can reasonably ascribe to different beliefs. <br /><br />If justification for believing P solely came from some some property dependent on the truth of P, then I could agree with Feldman. However, as psychological beings, there are non-truth conducive justifications that lead to beliefs because of their value/utility. <br /><br />He seems to want to treat everyone as some sort of equal epistemic agent. However, how we ought to act as epistemic agents is often not how we act as psychological agents. His mistake, I think, is the implied idea that all agents are epistemic agents, when in fact that is simply not the case. <br /><br />MattMatthttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07068629169998511865noreply@blogger.com